The blue tit searches rocky Cliffs for suitable nesting sites in Spring. Many sites are examined and rejected for further search. If after t-amount of time no 'optimal' site is found, the animal returns to the best of the previously unsuitable sites. Under failure conditions it gradually relaxes its standards. (Hinde, 1952) Under certain test conditions chimpanzees evidently give out misinformation concerning the location of hidden rewards to uncooperative human participants in the test situation. As well, to cooperative humans, they provide accurate information on location of hidden rewards in apparent anticipation of receiving the reward. Such deceptive and communicative tactics have also been observed in the natural environment. (Woodruff and Premack, 1979; Menzel, 1975) Even the behavior of bacteria and protozoa seems useful to such organisms. Yet, no one supposes that the explanation of their comings and goings requires the use of any notion of representation on the organism's part. A more or less simple chemical and stimulus/response account is fully adequate to these phenomena. Perhaps the blue tit exhibits responses whose explanation requires the concept of representation. Whether or not it does will depend on the acceptability of the explanations which make use merely of such notions as native capacity, fixed action patterns, feedback, and stimulus-re-sponse learning. Chimpanzees on the other hand pretty clearly represent states-of-affairs and use representations purposefully. Here there does seem to be a required level of explanation in terms of such notions as representations, if not also such notions as intentions, purposes, and the like. (Much more about chimps and other great apes below.)
A survey of these cases and others of the same sort easily leads to the supposition that there are four layers of animal action and representation, beginning with mere movement, mere feedback mechanisms, and representation to the degree nil and ending with sophisticated undertakings, communications, and representations among the informavores, of which homo sapiens are prime examples. Here is a first approximation to the four levels of activities and their explanatory ingredients. 3. All of level 2 plus sensory transduces with 'information' from distal objects and functional architecture for acquiring habits and routines whose patterns are plastic and whose responses are correctable. Corrections require correspondence to distal objects and to future states-of-affairs. Hence, representation is required.
4. All the previous levels with the addition of functional architecture for planning, communicating cognitive states, inference, and fully intentional action. Examples are the 'informavores' and, perhaps, some of the great apes and the dolphins. I assume that the species which occupy suitably perfected versions of these levels are equipped to do so as a result of natural selection. We wish, then, to examine the ways in which repre-
